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Deception Honeypots: 
Deep Intelligence 
Nil Ortiz Rabella 
Resum—En un món on Internet és una eina fonamental pel desenvolupament de les empreses, que volen créixer i establir-se 
en el mercat econòmic global, la seguretat dels seus sistemes informàtics es converteix en una necessitat. La constant 
evolució de les tecnologies, promou un ambient en el qual els mètodes que es fan servir per atacar els sistemes informàtics, 
evolucionen encara més ràpid que les pròpies tecnologies, crean un estat on és pràcticament impossible garantir la integritat i 
la seguretat completa dels sistemes. La majoria dels mètodes actuals de seguretat, tenen com a objectiu la prevenció o 
detecció. Per aquest motiu aquest treball implementa els honeypots d’alta interacció, amb els quals podem implementar un 
factor proactiu en la nostre seguretat, atraient als atacants a un espai controlat, per aprendre els seus mètodes i fer servir 
aquesta informació per protegir els sistemes reals. En  aquest article, es proposa el desenvolupament d’un honeypot d’alta 
interacció i la seva implementació, en una xarxa similar al entorn de producció d’una empresa per enganyar possibles atacants.     
Paraules clau—Honeypot, Alta interacció, Cyber-seguretat, Deception, Intel·ligència d’amenaçes, Amenaça dirigida 
 
Abstract—In a world where Internet is a key element for the development of any company, that wants to rise and establish in 
the economic global market, the security of the computer systems used in the company’s becomes an imperious need. The 
constant evolution of technology, provides an environment where the methods used to attack the computer systems evolve 
even faster than the technologies itself, creating a state where it is practically impossible to assure the integrity and complete 
security of the systems. Most actual security methods and policies, act only as a prevention or detection solution. Therefore in 
this paper we implement high interaction honeypots, which allow a new proactive factor in our security, to attract the attackers 
into a controlled environment, where we can learn their methods and use that information to protect the real systems. In this 
paper we will propose the development of a high interaction honeypot, and its implementation in a network, which we could find 
in a real bussines environment. 
Index Terms—Honeypot, High interaction, Cyber-security, Deception, Threat intelligence, Targeted threat 
 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
OWADAYS Internet has taken part not only of our 
personal life, but it is a core piece in the scheme of 
any company that wants to succeed in a global market, 
and for every successful product, there is someone trying 
to get advantage illegally from it. 
 
Cyber-crime is an ongoing and critical issue that raises 
every day, evolving even faster than security, and no 
longer can we think of a computer system in terms of 
completely protected, with preventive and detection poli-
cies as our only security, it is just a matter of time since 
our systems gets compromised, and maybe by the time 
we find the breach it will be too late to prevent losses.  
 
In the last years, a new approach to security has been 
developed, proactive security, instead of trying to keep 
the attackers from breaching in the system, create a con-
trolled environment where we can track all the actions 
done by any attacker to learn their methods and tech-
niques to improve the security of our real systems at the 
same pace as the attacks evolve.  
 
The honeypots are tools designed to detect, deflect and 
counteract unauthorized use of a computer system, they 
can be classified in two groups, low interaction honeypots 
and high interaction honeypots, the core difference be-
tween the two groups is that the low interaction honey-
pots don’t provide real services, they only simulate them, 
therefore the information that can be obtained through 
this type of honeypot has quite low depth or value, where 
high interaction honeypots have real services with whom 
the attackers can fully interact, and provide information 
about each and action done by the attacker that can be 
used to prepare our security against it on the real sys-
tems.  
 
In order to enhance the security of a company, we can 
place a high interaction honeypot in the same network as 
the real production systems that will attract potential 
attackers and waste their time using deception tech-
niques. 
N 
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There are four styles of deception, which combined 
create the so called Deception Stack. The deception stack 
consists of a set of tools and responses that operate at 
different layers the attacker may interact with, the net-
work, endpoint, application and data layers. In order for 
the deception techniques to be believable, they have to be 
deployed across the whole Deception Stack, it is im-
portant to notice that further the attack carries on; the 
harder it becomes to maintain the deception. [1] 
 
A graphic of the deception stack can be found on the 
section A1 of the annex. 
 
 
1.1 Objectives 
This work is done in cooperation with Blueliv, a targeted 
cyber-threat intelligence provider for enterprises, aiming 
to provide new sources of threat intelligence and counter-
intelligence data. 
 
The main objective of this project is to develop a high 
interaction honeypot, which can be deployed in to a fully 
functional business network to retrieve intelligence about 
the attacks targeted to the network company. 
 
The specific goals to accomplish the main objective are 
the following: 
 
1. Find or develop a series of tools to monitor the 
honeypots at both user and kernel level. 
2. Harden the system to keep the attackers from 
fully compromising the system. 
3. Implement a logging system that can produce 
personalized outputs from the system calls, 
the user’s activities and the network traffic. 
4. Install and modify a series of services and ap-
plications to be exploited. 
5. Test all services and functionalities. 
6. Develop deception techniques to retrieve 
deeper intelligence on the attacks. 
7. Develop installation scripts to automate the 
deployment process. 
 
 
While objectives two, three and five are the most im-
portant for the project itself,  spending more time on the 
objectives one and seven will provide a more solid solu-
tion. Objective six could be split for each layer of the de-
ception stack optionaly, but since we will be focusing on 
the data layer, there is no need. 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research 
In order to gain a full view of the state of the art in the 
field of honeypots, both high and low interaction, an 
extensive research phase took place at the start of the 
project. The goal of the research phase was to understand 
the architechture and functionality of honeypots that 
could become the first stone of the project. 
 
      This phase concluded with the results that there was 
no available build-in technology suitable to our case, 
hence we would need to elaborate our own customize 
solution. 
 
2.2 Requirements 
In order to ease the design phase, a set of basic require-
ments for the high interaction honeypot that would be 
fundamental to the succeed status of the project were 
established. 
 
2.3 Design 
After having set the initial requirements of the project, the 
design phase started, trying to find tools that fitted our 
needs to register all activity done in the system and to-
wards it, considering the requirements, a specific architec-
ture for the system was planned and series of services 
and applications were selected to be tested. 
 
2.4 Development 
Once the design of the system was complete and all re-
quirements and functionalities were established, they 
were developed combining open-source tools with tai-
lored scripts for each situation. 
 
2.5 Test 
After the system architechture was developed and func-
tional, we begin to test to functionalities of the services 
and our capability to register the activity done by a user, 
this test were conducted on a standalone honeypot, first 
simulating attacks from our own platform and then set-
ting the honeypot open for real attackers to interact with.  
 
2.6 Deployment 
Once all functionalities of the honeypot were tested, a 
base image of the system was developed and deployed to 
a series of honeypots to create a proof of concept, each 
system was then loaded with tailored scripts to deploy 
the desired services. 
 
A deception story was planified to interconnect the 
honeypots and mislead the attackers from on to another 
in order to acquire intelligence on their methods. 
 
3 STATE OF THE  ART 
Even if the project was aimed towards high interaction 
honeypots, to understand better its functionality, low 
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interaction honeypots were also part of the research pro-
cess and considered to be part of the project initial state. 
 
3.1 Honeypots 
Honeypots are security resources that simulate and pre-
tend to be services of a computing system, or the whole 
system, with vulnerabilities or weak points in order to be 
probed, attacked, compromised, used or accessed in any 
unauthorized way. [2] 
 
Their objective is to gather all the possible information 
from these attacks or unauthorized accesses in order to 
study the methodology used from the attackers and pre-
vent them in the future. Since they only simulate the envi-
ronment and responses of these services, no sensitive 
information is compromised from the attacks. 
 
3.1 Low interaction honeypots 
Low interaction honeypots simulates services, networks 
or other aspects of a real computing system, usually they 
simulate a limited set of services and network protocols 
(mostly TCP and IP) that allow a limited interaction with 
the attacker in order for him to think at it is a real system. 
 
The main advantages of low interaction honeypots it is 
that they are easy to deploy and maintain, even without 
deep knowledge in the field; with a basic configuration 
anyone can deploy a low interaction honeypot in their 
network. Since every service its simulated, this kind of 
honeypots can’t compromise the real system behind it, 
because they only offer a limited set of interactions with 
the attacker, if he were able to surpass the honeypot using 
instructions out of its reach, he would discover that it is a 
honeypot instead of a real system but still couldn’t do 
anything in the system behind it. 
 
The fact that the interactions with the attacker are lim-
ited develops the main problem with these type of 
honeypots, they can only retrieve a limited amount of 
information about the attacks based on what interactions 
are designed to handle. 
 
Considering everything stated before, it is clear that 
this kind of honeypots aren’t useful to gather intelligence 
against targeted attacks, but their main use is to gather 
statistics on attack types and patterns. They can also be 
used as a NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System) 
given the fact that the honeypot isn’t a production sys-
tem; any access attempts can be considered as an attempt 
to breach in the network. 
 
3.2 High interaction honeypots 
High interaction honeypots are real systems, with a real 
operating system, real services and real protocols. To 
disguise the honeypot in a network it is advised that the 
honeypot has the same operating system and the same 
services that the other systems in the network have. 
 
Since it is a real system, the interactions with the at-
tacker are also real and this allow us to gather all possible 
information about the attack, every command or file 
used, every I/O action, every bit of data transmitted 
through the network is recorded and encapsulated in a 
session for post forensic analysis. We can also modify the 
system in any way we need to make it look like the pro-
duction systems, enabling the same services, creating 
similar file systems, using outdated former credentials, 
and since it is placed in the same network than the pro-
duction systems but isn’t actually one of them, any access 
will be categorized as an attack, eliminating the false 
positive alerts and providing a view of focused and tar-
geted attacks against a network. 
 
Given that the system is real, the operating system and 
the services may have vulnerabilities out of our 
knowledge that can be exploited and used against us, 
therefore the possibility of having a compromised honey-
pot becomes real, and so it has to be prepared and pro-
tected from any unwanted activity, it is the designer re-
sponsability to make sure that the attacker can’t use the 
system for anything that isn’t supposed to do, which 
leads to a high cost design, deploy and maintenance. 
   
3.3 Honeynet  
Honeynets [3] extend the concept of a single honeypot to 
a highly controlled network of honeypots. A honeynet is 
a specialized network architecture configured in a way to 
achieve data control, data capture and data collection. 
This architecture creates a highly controlled network, in 
which one can control and monitor all kind of systems 
and online activity. Honeypots are then placed within this 
network. A basic honeynet is composed by honeypots 
placed behind a transparent gateway – the honeywall. 
Acting as a transparent gateway the honeywall is unde-
tectable by the attackers and serves its purpose of logging 
all network activity going in or out of the honeypots. 
 
3.4 BeeSwarm 
BeeSwarm [4] is a built-in solution for Linux to deploy a 
honeynet using low-interaction honeypots, its ar-
chitechture its similar to the honeynet minus the honey-
wall, but it keeps the three main focus points of data con-
trol, data capture and data collection. 
 
     The minimum agents that compose BeeSwarm are a 
system with a BeeSwarm server who is responsible for 
deploying the rest of the agents and receiving the data 
gathered on them, it also provides a web interface to vis-
ualize the data retrieved from the honeypots and classify 
the attacks in two types, as credential reuse if the attacker 
manged to log in or brute force if the attacker didn’t log 
in the service. 
 
The other agents are the honeypot sensor and the 
honeypot drone. The sensor is the one with the simulated 
services, BeeSwarm provides simulation of 9 services and 
protocols (FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, POP3, POP3S, SMTP, SSH, 
Telnet, VNC) through Python scripts. The honeypot 
drone has the same base as the sensor, but doesn’t simu-
late any services, it only generates traffic against the 
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honeypot sensors through dummy tests connections feed-
ing them a set of pre-stablished credentials. 
 
Theoretically an attacker could intercept the traffic be-
tween the drones and the sensors and then reuse the sto-
len credentials to attack the sensors, but usually the 
drone’s traffic is used only to generate activity in the sen-
sors, in order to make the sensors look like real systems 
with real activity to deceive anyone who is sniffing the 
network. 
 
3.5 Sebek  
Sebek [5] is a data capture tool. As with all data capture 
tools, the goal is to capture data that will allow us to ac-
curately recreate the events on a honeypot. 
 
Sebek has two components, the client and the server. 
The client captures data of a honeypot and exports it to 
the network where is collected by the server. The server 
collects the data from one of two possible sources: the 
first is a live packet capture from the network, the second 
is a packet capture archive stored as a tcpdump formatted 
file. Once the data is collected it is either uploaded into a 
relational data base or the keystroke logs are immediately 
extracted. The communications used by Sebek are UDP 
based and as such are connection-less and unreliable. 
 
The client resides entirely in kernel space on the 
honeypot and, in the case of the Linux version, is imple-
mented as a Loadable kernel Module (LKM). The client 
can record all data that a user accessed via the read() 
system call. This data is then exported to the server over 
the net in a manner that is difficult to detect from the 
honeypot running Sebek. The server then gathers the data 
from all of the reporting honeypots. Since there is a 
standard platform independent log format the server can 
collect from any honeypot independent of Operating 
System type. 
 
Since Sebek register the activity of the honeypot ac-
cessing to the system calls of the operating system at ker-
nel space, even if the attacker were to download and use 
trojaned binaries or shared libraries to bypass regular 
loggin methods, every action would still be recorded by 
Sebek, the only way to surpass it would be a hook on the 
system calls table at kernel space, which should take too 
much time for the attacker to do without being kicked 
from the system. It is a perfect tool to deploy in a high 
interaction honeypot. 
 
3.6 Loadable kernel modules (Linux) 
The most basic method of adding code or capabilities in 
the Linux kernel is through adding source files in the 
kernel source tree and recompile it, actually the configu-
ration of the kernel consists mainly of choosing a set of 
files to include in the kernel. But there is a method to add 
code to the Linux kernel while its still running without 
recompiling it. 
 
Loadable kernel modules (LKM) [6] are chunks of code 
that can be loaded in the kernel on the go, they usually 
provide functionalities for device drivers, file system 
drivers and system calls, but are not limited to those. 
 
3.7 Linux security modules  
The Linux Security Module (LSM) [7] framework pro-
vides a mechanism for various security checks to be 
hooked by new kernel extensions. The name "module" is 
a bit of a misleading since these extensions are not actual-
ly loadable kernel modules. Instead, they are selectable at 
build-time and can be overridden at boot-time. 
 
The primary users of the LSM interface are Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) extensions which provide a com-
prehensive security policy. LSM include SELinux, Smack, 
Tomoyo, and AppArmor. In addition to the larger MAC 
extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to 
provide specific changes to system operation when these 
tweaks are not available in the core functionality of Linux 
itself. 
4 REQUIREMENTS 
After understanding the nature of the high interaction 
honeypots we set a base of requirements for the design of 
the honeypot.  
 
1. Operating system: 
a. Has to be customizable. 
b. Has to be easy to deploy. 
2. System security: 
a. We must remain in control of the 
honeypot before, during and after the 
attacker breaches in even if he gets 
root permissions. 
b. The tools used to monitor the honey-
pot must be concealed from the at-
tacker. 
c. Failed attempts to breach in the sys-
tem must also be logged. 
3. Services: 
a. They have to be customizable 
b. Provide a method to retrieve new or 
modified files. 
4. Monitoring 
a. We have to be able to register all ac-
tivity at both kernel and user level. 
b. Any changes done by the service in 
the file system must be logged. 
c. All actions done by the attacker must 
be logged. 
d. We must be able to retrieve any new 
or modified files by the attacker. 
e. The actions of a specific attacker must 
be registered in a specific session with 
a specific identifier. 
5. Deploy: 
a. Customizable within the needs of the 
client. 
b. Easy and automate deployment. 
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5 DESIGN 
In order to comply with the requirements, the following 
solution became the design of the high interaction honey-
pot. The names of certain tools or software cannot be 
revealed due to a confidentiality agreement with Blueliv. 
 
For the operating system we chose Linux Ubuntu 4.7 
since it is an open source solution, which provides exten-
sive documentation to ease the process of customization 
and can easily be installed on any machine using virtual 
images. 
 
In order to achieve the security requirements we con-
sidered using LSM, but were discarded because: LSM 
only involve Mandatory Access Control (MAC) through 
file system permission, LSM is compiled and enabled in 
the kernel, which means that the symbols are exported 
and every hook is accessible using root-kits, allowing the 
attacker to be create back-doors and be completely unde-
tected, since LSM are included in the Linux kernel since 
release 2.6, advanced attackers would be aware of its 
presence.  
 
Instead, we modified the Linux kernel using an al-
ready build solution as a base, that allowed us to track all 
system calls and a software that works upon the custom 
kernel like the LSM but using Role Base Access Control 
(RBAC) policies and allows control over all Linux capabil-
ities, the RBAC functionality allow to create a new level 
of permission above the usual root user, that acts like a 
super-root, invisible to any attacker and only available 
with the appropiate credentials, using this features we 
can easily hide any process, parts of the file system and 
pretty much anything we need from the attacker.  
 
To keep a register of the connection attempts, port 
scans and other sniffing network actions, we used an 
Intrusion detection System (IDS) software to examine the 
packets before and after they enter in the system, the IDS 
had been pre-loaded with some traffic rules created by 
the community and some rules developed by us. 
 
On the initial phase of the design, we included the fol-
lowing services: 
1. FTP 
2. Samba 
3. HTTP 
4. SSH 
5. VNC 
6. OpenVPN 
Later we decided to focus only on the FTP, Samba, 
HTTP and SSH services due to the lack of use and possi-
ble information that was retrievable of the remaining.  
 
To enhance security, the FTP and Samba services were 
configured to prevent the users from accessing any other 
part of the file system that was not dedicated to the ser-
vice, limitating the FTP users to their home path and the 
Samba users to a unique share.  
 
HTTP was implemented using Apache2, enabling spe-
cific modules to enhance the security of Apache2 and 
retrieve more information from the HTTP requests; we 
also added the possibility to equip Apache2 with Word-
Press and phpMyAdmin depending on the needs of the 
client.  
 
SSh was configured so only a list of specific users 
could gain access to the system using the standard 
username password log in option.  
 
To achive the monitoring requirements a few options 
were considered, sebek seemed like a good option, but it 
needs a kernel 2.4 for Linux, which not only is highly 
outdated but also would conflict with our custom kernel 
previously mentioned, and does not have active support 
or a community behind it.  
 
The next explored option was to make us of the log-
ging facilities of Linux itself and the services along side 
with the tracking of system calls implemented in the cus-
tom kernel, which then would be parsed and sent to a 
centralized server to process the information. This solu-
tion was deeply tested using a server with Logstash, an 
open source, server-side data processing pipeline that 
ingests data from a multitude of sources simultaneously, 
transforms it, and then sends it to the storage application, 
to process the information, ElasticSearch, a distributed, 
RESTful search and analytics engine that stores data in-
dexed in volumes, to store and sort it and Kibana, an 
open source data visualization plugin for Elasticsearch, to 
display the final information, but was discarded because 
it was very difficult to encapsulate the actions of a user in 
a session format across all services, we would need some 
sort of backup software to retrieve the new or modified 
files which added a new layer of complexity due to the 
possibility of I/O atomic operations. 
 
Finally, we decided to use a software that reads the 
system calls of the kernel and saves them in a file that can 
later be processed using LUA scripts, the developers of 
the software provides a wide variety of scripts but we 
chose to develop our own scripts to extract the infor-
mation that better suited our needs. 
 
To improve visibility from the network traffic and the 
actions developed outside of the system, we used the IDS 
not only to emit alerts but also capture the network traffic 
in a pcap format. 
 
To fulfil deployment requirements we created a set of 
bash scripts that install all the Linux packages, tools and 
services that we need in a modular fashion, therefore 
when a customer needs to deploy a honeypot we can 
execute a series of scripts on the machine to install the 
base of the honeypot and the functionalities selected by 
the customer without having to remove or leave unused 
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modules. 
6 TEST 
To test all capabilities and services of the honeypot, we 
deployed a standalone virtual machine with the previous-
ly mentioned set up, including the FTP, Samba, HTTP 
(Apache2) and SSH services. The system was being moni-
tored with the kernel syslog and the services own loggin 
facilities which were sent to a centralized server using 
Filebeat. On that server an instance of Logstash received 
and parsed the logs using grok patterns and then the logs 
were stored on a ElasticSearch, this server also had an 
instance of Kibana to visualize the logs in a comprehen-
sive way. 
 
In order to test the logging mechanism’s the FTP and 
Samba services were configured so they could be ac-
cessed anonymously. The Apache2 logging facilities were 
modified to acquire the request headers, the request 
body, the response headers and the response body. To 
monitor the activity on the SSH service we kept track of 
the attempts of connection using the auth.log provided by 
the operating system and once a intruder managed to get 
in the system, we monitored he’s activity tracing the sys-
tem calls using the logging facilities provided by the cus-
tom kernel and implementing a script to record the ses-
sion commands when ever a shell is created in the Linux 
system, two users were created, one with a very easy to 
guess password and another one with a more complex 
but quite accessible password, the root password was set 
at the highest difficulty to test the capabilities of the at-
tackers. 
 
The first month of activity generated on the standalone 
test virtual machine provided us a lot of intelligence on 
how the attacks were being executed. The following table 
shows the statistics of the attacks during the first month. 
TABLE 1 
ATTACKS STATISTICS 
 
Service FTP Samba SSH Apache2 
Attacks 1.110 
(12%) 
462 
(5%) 
5924 
(64%) 
1758 
(19%) 
Successful 966 
(87%) 
328 
(71%) 
1421 
(24%) 
X 
Files up-
loaded 
113 48 906 0 
Different 
IP’s 
535 171 3859 768 
 
As we can see on the table above, the SSH service re-
ceived the most attacks, but only 24% of them were suc-
cessful, that is because most of the attacks were from bots 
that just go through dictionaries trying different sets of 
users and passwords, it is worth mentioning that only 
seven attackers were able to access with the root user, but 
even then they weren’t able to gain full access of the vir-
tual machine hence the security policies from the RBAc 
software and the custom kernel proved to work so far. 
During the SSH sessions the attackers usually started 
looking what permissions do they had, then trying to 
create a new user and download some root-kit or com-
mand and control software to include the machine in a 
bot network. 
 
The FTP and Samba services were the ones with the 
highest success rate, that is because when first connecting 
to the service, you would receive a banner advertising the 
virtual machine as an anonymous server, still some at-
tackers didn’t manage to get it, probably bots without the 
option to access using empty credentials.  
 
The sessions on the FTP service followed two defined 
patterns, the first one could be labeled as mass deploy 
since they uploaded files on every available directory, 
usually bit coin miners, and the second patter could be 
labeled as reconnaissance since they try to move laterally 
through the file system to find files with valuable data in 
the /etc, /opt and /home directories, but failed since the 
FTP user only had visibility of the directory specified for 
its purpose. 
 
The successful Samba sessions followed two patterns 
that looked alike the FTP sessions, the first was like the 
FTP mass deploy, were the attackers would upload files, 
again mostly bit coin miners, on every available directory, 
and in the second one the attackers would first check if 
the operating system was windows or Linux, then look 
for all the available shares, printers and other devices, 
and then try to reconnect on the new found devices. 
 
For the HTTP service, Apache2 was configured to al-
low any request but always return either the default in-
dex.html file or a 404 response, therefore if we define a 
session as a number of requests done by the same IP dur-
ing a limited short time, we can separate the attacks in 
two sections, the first one would be PUT request were the 
attacker would try to input code using binary or hexadec-
imal characters to run commands on the virtual machine, 
which failed since one of the modules of Apache2 pre-
vented any code from the requests to be executed. The 
second one would be a series of GET requests of different 
files to identify if there was any application on the 
Apache2 service, mostly phpMyAdmin and, less but still 
worth considering, WordPress. The GET request not only 
looked for applications but also bot-nets, in this case the 
most searched was muieblackcat, a web scanner bot that 
attempts to exploit PHP vulnerabilities or missconfigura-
tions. Since the GET requests never found any of the files, 
we have no information about what the attacker may do 
next. 
 
The logs generated from the attacks contained a lot of 
useless or repeated information and it was difficult to 
keep track of a single attacker through the different ser-
vices of the virtual machine, hence we decided to imple-
ment a different and unified logging system for all ser-
vices using a software that reads all system calls on a 
kernel level, then tracking the process of the service we 
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could easily record all activity on a single file that later, 
when the session had finished, would be analyzed using 
LUA scripts developed to extract different information 
from each session file, using this method also would facil-
itate display the output. 
7 DEPLOYMENT 
Considering that the test on the standalone machine was 
successful we proceeded to deploy 8 virtual machines 
with different services to create a honeypot network as a 
proof of concept. 
 
The following table shows the services installed on 
each honeypot deployed in the honeypot network. 
 
TABLE 2 
HONEYPOT NETWORK 
 FTP Samba SSH Apache2 
Alpha   X  
Bravo   X X 
Charlie   X X 
Delta X    
Echo X    
Foxtrot  X   
Golf  X   
Hotel X X X X 
 
 
All honeypots have the same base configuration with 
the custom kernel, the RBAC policies, the system call 
reader software and the IDS software.  
 
We pictured a story to get accross the honeypots and 
test how the attackers may move through a real produc-
tion network were the goal was to gain access to the Hotel 
honeypot. 
 
We created a user with the most used credentials on 
the honeypots with the FTP and Samba services and 
placed a series of documents with users, passwords and 
IP’s of the Alpha, Bravo and Charlie honeypots to gain 
access through the SSH service. 
 
Since we received a lot of GET requests on the 
standalone honeypot concerning phpMyAdmin and 
WordPress, we placed an instance of phpMyAdmin on 
the Bravo honeypot and an instance of WordPress on the 
Charlie honeypot, both systems had a MySQL data base 
with credentials to access the same machine respectively 
using the SSH service and the Alpha honeypot. 
 
In the Alpha honeypot we created a series of users 
bound with each of the other honeypots that lead to Al-
pha, to keep track of where the attacker had gotten the 
credentials to access it and keep track of its actions. Inside 
this honeypot there were files with credentials to access 
each service of the Hotel honeypot. 
 
Most of the attacks the honeypots received didn’t fol-
lowed the story we set up and got stuck in the first 
honeypot they got access to, without developing any kind 
of lateral movement, but we will focus on the ones that 
did follow the story line. 
 
From the FTP honeypots there wasn’t any attack that 
managed to use the credentials found in the file system to 
gain access to the Alpha honeypot which leads to believe 
that most of the activity generated on there honeypots it 
is caused by bots and not actual human attackers, but 
since they downloaded the files, that could happen later 
on. 
 
From the Samba honeypots one attacker managed to 
access the Alpha honeypot and download a set of scripts 
to transform the honeypot in to a proxy SMTP server to 
forward spam mail, using the IDS we were able to read 
and save all the e-mails sent, and keep a list of source 
systems that most likely are also compromised machines. 
 
On the Bravo honeypot an attacker managed to gain 
access to the same machine using the SSH credentials 
stored on the MySQL data base and also transformed the 
honeypot in to a proxy SMTP server to forward spam 
mail, using also the IDE we were able to retrieve the same 
information. 
 
On the Charlie Honeypot several attackers managed to 
use the credentials stored on the MySQL data base and 
gain access to the Alpha honeypot, where five of them 
managed to escalate privileges through a vulnerability 
named Dirty COW [8] of the type race condition, and find 
the credentials to gain access to the Hotel honeypot, these 
attackers certainly would have to be humans. 
 
So far from the five attackers that managed to gain the 
credentials to access the Hotel honeypot, only four of 
them have access it. All attackers used the SSH service to 
access the honeypot. One of the attackers left the honey-
pot shortly after breaking in; therefore we can assume 
that he realized it was a honeypot and not a real machine. 
Two of the attackers spend almost an hour in the system, 
looking for potential valuable data and trying to install 
different services and root-kits that failed due to the cus-
tom kernel and the protections set by the RBAC policies. 
The last attacker downloaded a command and control 
package to use it as part of a bot-net which failed for the 
same reason as the previous two mentioned, then pro-
ceeded to download various bit coin miners and left. 
8 RESULTS 
During the two weeks that the eight virtual machines 
corresponding to the honeypot network were online and 
fully functioning, they gathered intelligence of hundreds 
of attacks each machine, both statistical data, and targeted 
intelligence against a specific machine.  
 
On the main entry points of the honeypot network 
8 EE/UAB TFG INFORMÀTICA: DECEPTION HONEYPOTS: DEEP INTELLIGENCE 
 
composed by the four honeypots with FTP and Samba 
services we have mostly statistical data about the at-
tempts to break in, the credentials used and the files up-
loaded to the services, since the access to these machines 
wasn’t locked down.  
 
On the Bravo and Charlie honeypots we have both 
types of information, statistical data consisting of the 
attempts to break in the SSH service and the requests that 
the Apache2 service received, and intelligence on targeted 
attacks using the credentials stored in the MySQL data 
base located respectively in each machine that can be 
used to gain access through the SSH service. 
 
On the Alpha and Hotel honeypots we also have both 
types of information, statistical data consisting of the 
attempts to break in the SSH service, and intelligence on 
targeted attacks using the credentials stored in the other 
honeypots. 
 
This architecture of the network allow us very easily to 
classify the more interesting information concerning the 
targeted attacks separated from the less meaning statisti-
cal data, since the virtual machines are not real produc-
tion servers, any access to anyone of the machines will be 
an attack without false positives. 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
In the requirements section, we stated five different as-
pects of the design that would need to be achieved to call 
the project a success. Through the design phase we were 
able to accomplish each requirement modifying the ker-
nel base of Linux to make it more secure and create a 
second layer of protection between the kernel and user 
level with the RBAC policies, due to the new layer of 
permissions we never lost control of the virtual machines 
even when the attackers escalated its privileges to root 
level.  
 
Using an IDS we were able to log all the network ac-
tivity to further inspect any action when it was needed, 
but this feature remains mostly as a second layer of back-
up information since all the attacks were analyzed using 
the system calls of the operating system. 
 
Currently, the honeypot network deployed as a proof 
of concept is still online and keeps gathering intelligence 
from the attacks received, the information is centralized 
in a platform that allow to visualize the attacks in a 
friendly user view that allows the client to keep track of 
the actions performed in each honeypot. 
 
The data gathered so far by the network of honeypots 
already provided valuable information about behaviors, 
trends of attacks and, in general, intelligence about cyber-
threats at anonymous scale.  
 
The solution implemented in the project seems viable 
to be adapted to the needs of the clients, with a few 
changes in the service configurations and RBAC policies, 
since the honeypots should resemble the actual produc-
tion systems. 
 
From a personal point of view, this project has served 
to learn about honeypot technology and to expand the 
previous knowledge about information security and net-
works. It also helped to take contact with many technolo-
gies, such as ElasticSearch, MySQL, IDS software, Linux 
kernel; to experience all the steps of a real development 
project; to understand the importance of a thorough re-
search and design stage and how positively it affects to 
the development of the project itself; and to be able to face 
unexpected problems and find suitable solutions in a 
limited time frame. 
 
10 FUTURE WORK 
Since the High interaction honeypots only differ from a 
real system by its use, the only limitation they have it is 
the time spent developing it. 
 
There are countless other services and applications that 
could be implemented to have ready to deploy, but it 
would be better to first ask what the clients need in order 
to not generate useless content. 
 
Right now the data acquired from the network sniffing 
by the IDS isn’t being actively used, with more time we 
could develop a platform that analyzed that data and 
provided a correlation with the attacks as well as new 
information that may not reach the system. 
 
The story created in the honeypot network relies in 
having a human attacker go through the available direc-
tories and fetching the documents that we exposed for 
him with the credentials, considering that a almost all 
attacks are originated by bots, we could develop a story 
that a bot may follow, creating virtual private networks 
between the honeypots, generating TLS/SSL certificates 
to access the SSH service of other machines among other 
methods.  
 
Last but not least, there could be a more in deep analy-
sis of the uploaded files and the data gathered by the 
honeypots. 
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